The Renaissance Economist – Research Revelations from a Rockstar of mine

Post by BSE Alum Nils Handler ’18 (International Trade, Finance, and Development Master’s Program)

Anxiously I was awaiting our meeting to begin, equally enthused by the prickling curiosity of what I was about to learn while simultaneously filled with an intimidating level of respect considering whom I was about to meet. Given how much I had read, heard and thought about his research while at the Barcelona School of Economics and his strong voice as a public intellectual, I was positively surprised when he confirmed our meeting. It was right after Claudia Goldin was awarded the Nobel Prize, so he surely was at his desk.

Daron Acemoglu is a towering figure in the economics profession as the breadth and depth of his research is virtually unparalleled. Rumors have it that he can churn out a paper on a weekend, many if not most of them land in the profession’s top 5 outlets, and that even close peers cannot keep up with his mathematical modelling. During his PhD at the London School of Economics, each chapter of his thesis is said to have merited a doctorate by itself. 

When doing my masters in economic history at LSE, I vividly remember how Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson – AJR – turned the discipline upside down at the time with their work on why nations fail. Their instrumental variable approach leveraging settler mortality data allowed a novel perspective on the longue durée, including hypothesis testing, that attracted heavy criticism and universal attention among scholars of economic history and development alike. 

Ein Bild, das Menschliches Gesicht, Person, Lächeln, Wand enthält.

Automatisch generierte Beschreibung

With Prof. Daron Acemoglu in his office at MIT

Now as part of my PhD, I am working on the direction of technological change, that is what determines whether technological development is dirty, thus heavily polluting, or clean, in that it emits much less carbon, and thus paves the way for economic growth to be green. As a Master student at LSE, I applied Acemoglu’s framework to understand why Costa Rica had become the “Switzerland of Central America”, while Honduras, the country where I had worked with street kids during my year as civil servant, a Banana republic.

I think of the knowledge in economics as an ever-expanding circle, with an exponentially increasing surface and a diameter so large by now that virtually nobody can reach both ends at the same time. Similarly, philosophers after Immanuel Kant could no longer labor all subfields in the profession. It takes what I would call a Renaissance Economist – like Acemoglu – to reach on both ends of the circle, that is an economist with a rare ease of penetrating seemingly disparate topics. The concept is based on the belief that human potential is limitless and that people should seek to develop themselves in multiple areas of expertise.  

Personally, I have developed what I would call a “green growth mindset” over the course of my PhD. I founded the d\carb future economy forum as part of my PhD, because I was keen on engaging with inspiring speakers discussing the big questions that had drawn me to economics in the first place. Economists such as Philippe Aghion, Ufuk Akcigit and Cameron Hepburn, who state that economic growth can be reconciled with environmental protection, as a matter of fact this constitutes the growth story of the 21st century. This was one of the questions that continued to puzzle me after my ITFD course on economic growth, that is whether the limits to growth constitute a binding constraint. It helped me find my own position in this tricky question, for which I consider green growth more persuasive than degrowth, as I believe that behavioral changes such as the ones enforced during the pandemic are insufficient to induce the 7 percent annual emission reductions required for net zero by 2050.

Psychologically, a growth mindset signifies that you don’t limit yourself with your own belief, consider your own abilities as malleable, in essence your brain a muscle that can be trained. The most powerful boost for your own motivation is outgrowing your own personal boundaries, that is achieving something you did not think you are capable of. That’s how I felt after completing the ITFD-program, and I do have to say it’s slightly addictive. That is why I am so enormously grateful for Jaume Ventura’s guidance in pursuing a PhD, because nobody in my family has ever done one, and my own imposter syndrome was keeping from choosing that route. Further, as a result of my first blog-post here at BSE Voice, a friend put me in touch with an actual US Navy Seal, who helped me navigate the emotional rollercoaster of the first year of PhD courses – I thought it couldn’t get tougher than the ITFD, yet then it did. Further, I can recommend Laura Blattner’s 15 rules to help you make it through grad school when things get tough. 

In short, I believe we should green our growth policies, for example as part of a new growth model for my native Germany, and that you can all achieve more than you think you are capable of if you conquer your own fear. At times I feel like I resemble one of the scientists in Acemoglu’s models of directed technological change, as I used to work on extractive industries at the World Bank up until the Paris Agreement inspired me to consider decarbonizing my own cv. Now I am working on green innovation and green growth, that is searching effective ways to lower the carbon content of our economy. 

This motivated my various questions to Prof. Acemoglu: Has his research caused the renaissance of green industrial policies, that is large, government-led finance and support for green industries? Are the latter synonymous with green subsidies in his models? Can those provide a segue for effective carbon pricing to subsequently kick-in? Will they suffice to reach a green growth equilibrium to ensue by inducing low-carbon innovation, and can high energy prices substitute their role? And what are the origins of this research on the direction of technological change? 

There is a Netflix documentary stating that MIT is the place for those who don’t fit in elsewhere, whose ideas appear crazy anyplace else. For me, this belief is that you can and should apply randomized controlled trials not merely in development economics, but much rather apply them to decarbonize our economies. I am immensely grateful that my host Jacquelyn Pless reinforced that believe in welcoming me to MIT Sloan. While in Boston, I was fortunate to also meet Josh Lerner, the doctoral advisor of my BSE professor Albert Bravo-Biosca, who had first inspired this idea in me, and – while at a conference in Chicago – the wonderful John List, who encouraged me to keep seeking to change the world with this idea. 

Ein Bild, das Menschliches Gesicht, Person, Bücherregal, Lächeln enthält.

Automatisch generierte Beschreibung

With Prof. Josh Lerner in his office at the Harvard Business School

Thanks to technological progress, you can now ask AI whether superintelligence, i.e. the hypothetical scenario where Artificial Intelligence is surpassing human intelligence, is around the corner. It’s modest assessment of its own capabilities – compared to Daron Acemoglu – suggests that this scenario is still very far away, as you can read below:

Who is smarter? ChatGPT or Daron Acemoglu? 

Daron Acemoglu is an acclaimed economist and professor known for his expertise in the fields of political economy, economic development, and institutions. He has made significant contributions to these areas through his research, publications, and teaching. Acemoglu has received numerous awards and honors for his work, including the John Bates Clark Medal, which is awarded to the best economist under the age of 40 in the United States.

On the other hand, ChatGPT is an AI language model developed by OpenAI. It is designed to understand and generate human-like text based on the training it has received from a large corpus of data. While ChatGPT is a sophisticated AI model with impressive language capabilities, it is important to note that it operates based on statistical patterns in the data it has been trained on and does not possess the same level of domain-specific expertise and intelligence as human experts like Daron Acemoglu.

Therefore, when it comes to comparing intelligence and expertise, Daron Acemoglu, as a highly respected economist and scholar, would be considered more knowledgeable and smarter in his specific field of study. However, it is worth mentioning that ChatGPT can provide a wide range of general knowledge and information across various domains beyond economics, making it a valuable tool for accessing information and generating text.

If this amused you and sparked your curiosity further, Nick Bostrom’s “Superintelligence – Paths, Dangers, Strategies” elaborates these questions in more detail, and “Power and Progress” by Prof. Acemoglu describes how Power does not spread in an egalitarian fashion as a result of technological progress, as well as potential antidotes. 


  1. That is epistemology, metaphysics, logic, axiology and political philosophy.
  2. Curious for tried ‘n tested Navy Seal techniques? Headspace, plus breathing exercises when you’re panicking: breath in for four seconds, hold for eight, breath out for four. Repeat. This WILL calm your mind, and calm is contagious, as they say.
  3.  He wouldn’t go that far 
  4. yes
  5. absolutely
  6.  The million dollar question
  7. yes
  8.  Hicks (1932), Kennedy (1964)

The Impact of the 2014-2016 Russian Financial Crisis on Remittances, Consumption, and Credit: The Case of Kyrgyzstan

International Trade, Finance, and Development master project by Rachel Breaks, Clément Durif, Peiyao Sun, and Joule Voelz ’22

Life in the Kyrgyz mountains. A family works and plays outside on a vast, green plain with rolling hills and mountains in the background under a blue sky dotted with fluffy white clouds. The family is in front of a white canopy tent and a beige dome hut, and a few horses graze around them.
Photo by Oziel Gómez on Unsplash

Editor’s note: This post is part of a series showcasing Barcelona School of Economics master projects. The project is a required component of all BSE Master’s programs.

Abstract

In this paper we consider the negative medium-term impact of the Russian Financial Crisis of 2014-2016 on remittances, consumption patterns, and credit in the Kyrgyz Republic.

Using panel data from the Life in Kyrgyzstan survey, we show a significant drop in migration to Russia and remittances from Russia on the extensive and intensive margins.

Households with a migrant abroad in Russia just prior to the crisis experience an average fall in real per capita income and an increase in poverty, while households both with and without a migrant rebalance their consumption basket to cope with the economic downturn.

Connect with the authors

Author info is current as of February 2023.

  • Rachel Breaks ‘22 is from Manchester, UK. She now works for the UK Government on international trade strategy with Latin America and the Caribbean.
  • Clément Durif ‘22 is from Nice, France. He now works at Asia Centre, a Paris-based think tank specializing in international relations.
  • Peiyao Sun ‘22 is from Hangzhou, ZJ (China). She is a pre-doctoral fellow at the ETH-Zurich in Zurich, Switzerland.
  • Joule Voelz ’22 is from San Francisco, CA (USA). She is a Data Science Methodology student at the Barcelona School of Economics.

About the BSE Master’s Program in International Trade, Finance, and Development

The additional costs of living with a disability in the UK

Publication in the European Journal of Health Economics by Lukas Schuelke ’21 (ITFD)

A woman in a wheelchair around Camden street market
Photo: iStock.com/VictorHuang

Last year I worked on the article, “Estimating the additional costs of living with a disability in the United Kingdom between 2013 and 2016,” which was based on my undergraduate dissertation and which just got published in the European Journal of Health Economics.

My co-authors Luke Munford and Marcello Morciano are affiliated with the School of Health Sciences at the University of Manchester.

Abstract

In the United Kingdom, more than 20% of the population live with a disability. Past evidence shows that being disabled is associated with functional limitations that often cause social exclusion and poverty. Therefore, it is necessary to analyse the connection between disability and poverty. This paper examines whether households with disabled members face extra costs of living to attain the same standard of living as their peers without disabled members. The modelling framework is based on the standard of living approach which estimates the extra income required to close the gap between households with and without disabled members. We apply an ordered logit regression to data from the Family Resources Survey between 2013 and 2016 to analyse the relationship between standard of living, income, and disability, conditional on other explanatory variables. We find that households with disabled members face considerable extra costs that go beyond the transfer payment of the government. The average household with disabled members saw their weekly extra costs continually increase from £293 in 2013 to £326 in 2016 [2020 prices]. Therefore, the government needs to adjust welfare policies to address the problem of extra costs faced by households with disabled members.

Connect with BSE authors

portrait

Lukas Schuelke ’21 is a Planning Analyst at Amazon in London, UK. He is an alum of the BSE Master’s in International Trade, Finance, and Development.

Where Does the Money Flow? Understanding Allocations of Post-Epidemic Foreign Aid

ITFD master project by Ashley Do, Nicolas Legrain, Nadine Schüttler, and María Soares de Lima ’21

Two hands cradle a transparent globe
Photo by Bill Oxford on Unsplash

Editor’s note: This post is part of a series showcasing Barcelona School of Economics master projects. The project is a required component of all BSE Master’s programs.

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to examine aggregate and cross-sector allocations of foreign aid flows in the aftermath of epidemics and to determine whether latent effects can be observed in the following year.

Using data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) on Bilateral commitments of Official Development Assistance (ODA) from 2005-2019, we employ an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model based on the structural gravity framework to account for spatial interactions between donor and recipient countries.

Our results show that epidemics have a positive and significant effect on bilateral foreign aid across all sectors and that aid to the Humanitarian sector is less conditional on pre-existing relationships than others. Results for latent effects on aid vary by sector.

We further find that isolating epidemics in our analysis suggests that certain diseases prompt a different aid response wherein aid to non-health sectors falls.

Conclusions

We find that epidemics do indeed engender changes in foreign aid behavior.

  • To be specific, epidemics have a positive and significant effect on foreign aid commitments to all sectors. Our results are unable to shed light on the hypothesis of reallocation between sectors. However, they do illustrate that aid to both health-related and non-health-related sectors increases.
  • Aid in this context is also persistent. That is, our results, robust to numerous checks, show that the positive effects of epidemics may be observed not only in the year of the outbreak but also in the following year.
  • By analyzing each disease independently, we further find that certain diseases prompt a different aid response and may suggest the presence of a foreign-aid reallocation due to epidemics.

However, our study does not measure the effectiveness of aid which is necessary for the design of productive policy measures that could save countless lives. Naturally, this presents new opportunities for research and raises important questions regarding the optimal allocation of aid given shocks to global health. That is, does increasing aid to all sectors serve as an effective one-size-fits-all solution? Or would a more efficient policy consist of donors reallocating aid across sectors to account for short and long-term changes in the demand for healthcare caused by an epidemic?

Connect with the authors

About the BSE Master’s Program in International Trade, Finance, and Development

How has public discourse on marriage equality affected change in US institutions?

Giulia Mariani ’12 (International Trade, Finance, and Development)

Gradual institutional change analyses have allowed drawing a more flexible line between stability and transformation when examining how institutions evolve over time, particularly in the absence of major critical junctures or exogenous shocks. Yet, the explanatory power of the theory has been undermined by a lack of attention to the overlapping boundaries of the modes of gradual institutional change, a relatively static model of agency, and conceptual confusion regarding what the modes of change exactly are.

In our recent article “Discursive Strategies and Sequenced Institutional Change: The Case of Marriage Equality in the United States” published in Political Studies, Tània Verge and I argue that addressing these shortcomings requires investigating the agent-based dynamics underpinning gradual institutional change and bringing to the fore the role of ideas. Indeed, ideas and discourses can have a constitutive impact in the creation, maintenance and reform of institutions, and actors strategically reframe problems and redirect solutions to influence both the process and the outcome of policy reforms.

Employing marriage equality in the United States as a case study, we show that the modes of gradual institutional change can be studied simultaneously as processes that unfold over time, often in a sequential fashion, as outcomes of these processes, and as strategies pursued by actors to steer, impede or undermine policy change.

Our results reveal that proponents and opponents of marriage equality have deployed discursive frames to legitimize institutional change to take off sequentially in a progressive direction — through the modes of “layering“ and “displacement“ — and in a regressive direction — through the mode of “conversion“.

Throughout this sequenced process, opposing actors have not only adjusted their discursive strategies to both their rivals and the targeted institutional venues, but have also shifted roles as change and status quo agents. Indeed, our study shows that the actors contesting the institutional status quo in one stage may become the actors defending it in a subsequent phase of the institutional change process, and vice versa. Thus, we argue that traditional, static conceptualizations of agency should be problematized and, rather than as resistance to gender-friendly reforms, opposition to marriage equality should be understood as a proactive mobilization to transform existing institutions.

The recent US Supreme Court decision in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia (2021) in favor of a Catholic foster care agency that refuses to work with same-sex couples, should then be understood as a victory of the years-long conservative strategy to undermine LGBT couples’ newly recognized right to marry.

Lastly, our study highlights the role of private actors as ideational entrepreneurs in the adoption and implementation of “morality policies,“ such as marriage equality. While morality policy scholars have so far predominantly examined how governmental actors shape policymaking, we show that the discursive strategies deployed by LGBT advocates, religious-conservative organizations and other private actors, such as foster care agencies, florists, and bakers, created new opportunities to influence policy debates and tip the scales to their preferred policy outcome.

Connect with the author

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Giulia Mariani ’12 is a postdoctoral researcher in Political Science at Uppsala University. She is an alum of the Barcelona GSE Master’s in International Trade, Finance and Development.

How can we rethink our economy for a more sustainable future?

Nils Handler ’18 presents the D\carb Future Economy Forum

I recently founded the D\carb Future Economy Forum with the goal of better informing the public debate on climate change on topics such as green growth, green macroeconomics and green innovation.

D\carb is strongly inspired by my Master’s studies at Barcelona GSE such as Antonio Ciccone’s class on Economic Growth and Albert Bravo-Biosca’s course on innovation policy.

Last week we held our virtual kick-off event, “Green Growth: Technological Innovation, Market Incentives and Investments for a Green Economy” to discuss the opportunities and risks of transitioning our economy into a sustainable future.

Our speakers were Prof. Ottmar Edenhofer, Director and Chief Economist of the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, and Prof. Cameron Hepburn, Director of the Economics of Sustainability Programme and Professor of Environmental Economics at the University of Oxford. Johanna Schiele, McCloy-fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, moderated the event.

The event was organized jointly with the Mercator Research Institute on Global Commons and Climate Change and the Sustainability Centre of the Hertie School of Governance.

https://player.vimeo.com/video/548483275

Upcoming events and more information about these topics is available on our website:

Connect with the author

Nils Handler ’18 is a PhD Student at DIW Berlin. He is an alum of the Barcelona GSE Master’s in International Trade, Finance, and Development.

Is the COVID-19 pandemic a consumption game changer?

Research co-authored by Alex Hodbod ’12 (ITFD) and Steffi Huber ’10 (Economics)

The CEPR journal on Covid Economics recently included the paper, “Is COVID-19 a consumption game changer? Evidence from a large-scale multi-country survey” by Alexander Hodbod ’12 (ITFD), Cars Hommes, Stefanie J. Huber ’10 (Economics), and Isabelle Salle.

Steffi gave an interview to CEPR’s Tim Phillips about the team’s research:

Policies to avoid zombification of the economy

In an accompanying VoxEU column, the authors discuss the risks that government responses to COVID-19 could “zombify” the economy.

“A representative consumer survey in five EU countries indicates that many consumers do not miss certain goods and services they have cut down on since the COVID-19 outbreak,” the authors explain in their column. “Fiscal policy must recognise that some firms will become obsolete in the altered post-COVID-19 environment. To achieve a swift recovery, these obsolete firms must be allowed to fail fast so that resources can be reallocated to more efficient uses. Instead, fiscal support should be laser-like in targeting those households who are particularly hard hit by the crisis. Such support should be oriented towards helping displaced workers retrain and find new jobs.”

Paper abstract and download

Prospective economic developments depend on the behavior of consumer
spending. A key question is whether private expenditures recover once
social distancing restrictions are lifted or whether the COVID-19 crisis
has a sustained impact on consumer confidence, preferences, and, hence,
spending. Changes in consumer behavior may not be temporary, as they
may reflect long-term changes in attitudes arising from the COVID-19
experience. This paper uses data from a representative consumer survey
in five European countries conducted in summer 2020, after the release
of the first wave’s lockdown restrictions. We document the underlying
reasons for households’ reduction in consumption in five key sectors:
tourism, hospitality, services, retail, and public transports. We identify
a large confidence shock in the Southern European countries and a
permanent shift in consumer preferences in the Northern European
countries. Our results suggest that horizontal fiscal support to all firms
risks creating zombie firms and would hinder necessary structural
changes to the economy.

Connect with the authors

  • Alexander Hodbod ’12 (International Trade, Finance, and Development). Counsellor to ECB Representative to the Supervisory Board, European Central Bank (DGSGO-SO), Frankfurt, Germany.
  • Cars Hommes. Professor of Economic Dynamics at CeNDEF, Amsterdam School of Economics, University of Amsterdam, and research fellow of the Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, Senior Research Director (Financial Markets Department), Bank of Canada.
  • Stefanie J. Huber ’10 (Economics). Assistant Professor at CeNDEF, Amsterdam School of Economics, University of Amsterdam, and research candidate fellow of the Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam, The Netherlands. 
  • Isabelle Salle. Principal Researcher at the Bank of Canada (Financial Markets Department), research fellow at the Amsterdam School of Economics, University of Amsterdam, and research fellow of the Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam, The Netherlands. 

Future paths for monetary policy in a world of lower inflation

Recap of Professor Jordi Galí’s ECB Forum presentation by Maximilian Magnacca Sancho ’21 (ITFD)

The stage for ECB Forum 2020
Photo by ECB on Flickr

On November 11, 2020 the first day of the ECB Forum on Central Banking began with three exciting talks on how shifts in the global economy have changed the game for central banks worldwide. Among the distinguished guest speakers at the Forum was UPF, CREi, and Barcelona Graduate School of Economics Research Professor, Jordi Galí. While the ECB had him slated to speak on the “Inflation Objective, Structural Forces, and Central Bank Communication,” Professor Galí spent his presentation focusing predominantly on inflation targeting at central banks and whether it should be revised going forward. 

Watch the ECB Forum panel discussion with Jordi Galí, Volker Wieland, and Annette Vissing-Jørgensen, chaired by Philip Lane on YouTube

His presentation spoke directly to an ongoing debate amongst academics and financial-market watchers, as there have been structural changes in the economy since the last update of the ECB’s policy in 2003. Structural changes are a normal function of an economy as it progresses along with society, though it has some troublesome side effects. Most concerningly, they reduce the effectiveness of policy in alleviating economic downturns by influencing the transmission mechanisms of monetary policy. This raises the challenge for policymakers in picking the best policy.

These structural changes ultimately centre around one crucial variable that is influenceable by central banks. The Steady-State Real Interest Rate, colloquially known as R*.  Central banks will be constrained by this rate and hit the zero lower bound sooner if they withhold from changing the inflation target – as argued by Jordi Galí in his presentation. A lower R*, as is being observed, necessitates a higher inflation target so that monetary policy (done through a changing of the interest rate) will have less incidence of the zero lower bound and thus reducing the chance of ineffectiveness.


This is obviously an urgent issue faced by policymakers worldwide during the ongoing COVID-19 crisis from the forefront of monetary economics research, yet what Professor Galí was able to do was bring it back to the basics of economics. He emphasised how the models are built on assumptions, and if assumptions change – as the data indicate they have – then the framework for thinking about these issues need to be updated.

In this spirit, Professor Galí proposed three potential policy changes for central bankers to consider in light of the ECB strategic review: he proposed more countercyclical fiscal support; changing to average inflation targeting; or a higher inflation target from its current position of “below or at 2%”. He acknowledged the challenges and potential pitfalls of all these policies, while also speaking to their potential improvement upon the current policy. 

It was great to see a Barcelona GSE professor invited to speak at such a prominent and interesting event held annually and frequented by policymakers and academics working on some of the most challenging issues in central banking. It highlights the quality of research that is being done at Barcelona GSE and the quality of the professors conducting that research being sought after by policymakers. 

Maximilian Magnacca Sancho ’21 is a student in the Barcelona GSE Master’s in International Trade, Finance, and Development.

This post was edited by Ashok Manandhar ’21 (Economics).

The Effectiveness of Debt Relief in Mitigating the Macroeconomic Consequences of Natural Disasters

ITFD master project by Emma Howard, Kean Murphy, Wouter Nientker, Karim El-Ouaghlidi, and Harry Schmidt ’20

land affected by severe drought
Photo: CNN

Editor’s note: This post is part of a series showcasing Barcelona School of Economics master projects. The project is a required component of all BSE Master’s programs.

Overview

Using a dynamic panel fixed effects model, we find that increases of ODA of above 2% of GDP have significant effects on the economic growth of African countries in the immediate aftermath of severe natural disasters. This is a surprising result because we do not find that ODA in times of relative stability has a significant effect on GDP. This suggests that debt relief, at least through the channel of significant increases in ODA, is an effective instrument in promoting post-disaster recovery, even though its effectiveness in raising economic growth more generally is limited. Since increases in ODA inflows of above 2% of GDP only occurred after 1/3 of the disasters we studied, we recommend that international financial institutions concentrate ODA flows on countries that had been afflicted by severe disasters. 

Introduction

One of the biggest challenges facing developing Sub-Saharan African economies is their vulnerability to severe natural disasters such as droughts and floods. Not only do they face on average over 50 disasters a year, but their economies’ over-reliance on agricultural production and weak institutional capacity cause them to experience the effects of these disasters particularly acutely. Worryingly, this vulnerability is likely to rise in the coming years, as the earth warms and climate change increases the number and severity of extreme climatic events. 

While it is difficult for countries to prevent natural disasters, since they tend to arise from exogenous climate conditions, they can take steps to mitigate these adverse consequences through post-disaster rehabilitation. To do so, governments require sufficient fiscal space so that they can borrow and spend without jeopardising budgetary sustainability. However, many African countries suffer from persistently high levels of debt, with 33 of the 39 countries in the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries scheme located on the continent. This constrains government spending on humanitarian relief and reconstruction, which can leave countries unable to recover from the devastation. 

In view of these twin trends – African economies’ vulnerability to natural disasters and their crippling levels of debt – any channel that reduces a country’s debt burden and hence increases its fiscal space should theoretically encourage faster economic recovery. This suggests that debt relief can be a vital policy instrument in mitigating the negative effects of natural disasters. However, corruption and inefficient resource allocation mean that its effectiveness may be constrained in practice. To explore the role of debt relief further, we employ a dynamic panel fixed effects model across the most severe 25 floods and 68 droughts in Africa from 1978 to 2013. As a robustness check, we also include an Anderson-Hsiao style GMM estimation procedure. We define debt relief as any policy that reduces the need for governments to issue new debt or repay existing debt, particularly in the aftermath of a natural disaster. In the context of this paper, this includes debt forgiveness, debt rescheduling and/or increased official development assistance (ODA). Furthermore, we run two different specifications of debt relief: first, using a dummy variable which indicates any instance of the aforementioned forms of debt relief; and second, using a continuous variable for ODA inflows alone. 

Main findings

Surprisingly, when we run our first specification, we find that debt relief in general does not have a statistically significant impact on economic growth. Additionally, ODA inflows in times of relative stability do not have significant effects on economic growth. Instead, they only reduce debt-to-GDP growth, suggesting that they are merely used by governments to pay off existing debt. This is in line with previous research by both Mejia (2014) and Raddatz (2009), who found at most weak evidence that either debt relief in the aftermath of disasters or ODA in general is effective in boosting economic growth. 

In contrast, we find that increases in inflows of ODA of above 2% of a country’s annual GDP, when provided in the year of or immediately after severe disasters, do have statistically significant positive effects on economic growth (see Figure 1). These findings are similarly observed when we interact our ODA variable with the continuous measure of disaster severity. For a given level of ODA, the effectiveness of post-disaster ODA increases in the severity of the underlying disasters. Furthermore, ODA inflows no longer have statistically significant effects on debt-to-GDP growth. This suggests that, unlike in regular times, ODA flows are used fruitfully by governments after disasters to bolster economic recovery rather than to pay off existing debt. 

figure
Figure 1

This is a notable result because it suggests that debt relief, at least through the channel of ODA, is an effective instrument to promote post-disaster recovery. This result differs from that found by previous research because we focus on ODA increases that a) were larger than 2% of GDP and b) occurred in the aftermath of severe natural disasters. This helps us isolate the specific role of ODA in promoting post-disaster recovery from its general effectiveness as a form of economic stimulus to boost growth. 

Policy implications

Our findings suggest that policymakers in international financial institutions such as the OECD or IMF should step up efforts to increase ODA inflows to developing countries when severe natural disasters hit. This not only has the direct effect of reducing the loss of lives, but is also vital for poverty reduction by ensuring that these countries return rapidly to their existing balanced growth path. Otherwise, countries risk experiencing persistent economic slowdown and skyrocketing debt due to the disasters, which would in turn lead to a vicious cycle of mounting debt and stagnant growth. Instead, increased ODA flows can substitute for the domestic shortfall in resources available to countries to rehabilitate the economy by providing emergency relief to citizens and rebuilding damaged infrastructure. 

Current attempts at mitigating such disasters are relatively limited: in our sample of 92 severe disasters in Africa between 1978 and 2013, large increases of ODA greater than 2% of GDP only occurred after 32 of these disasters. This is surprisingly infrequent, especially considering that we focus only on the largest of disasters which should have ample international media coverage. As highlighted above, larger increases in ODA have greater cumulative effects on the economy, especially for more severe disasters. As this effect is not observed when we study ODA inflows in times of stability or inflows below 2% of GDP, we recommend that existing ODA programmes prioritise large flows to countries which have just suffered from severe natural disasters. This is because the marginal benefit of these targeted flows in promoting development is likely higher than general flows to countries that are relatively stable. 

Finally, although our paper focuses on floods and droughts in Africa, we believe that our results can be generalized to other types of disasters. Although further research is needed to fully establish the causal mechanism by which debt relief improves post-disaster outcomes, it is likely that it will have a similar positive impact in rehabilitating economies that face disasters which leave them with high levels of debt and significantly lower budgetary revenue. Most notably, it suggests that significant increases in ODA flows can play a vital role in helping developing economies devastated by the COVID-19 pandemic by allowing them to mitigate its adverse effects. 

References

Mejia, S. A. (2014, July). Debt, Growth and Natural Disasters A Caribbean Trilogy (IMF Working Papers No. 14/125). International Monetary Fund. Retrieved from https://ideas.repec.org/p/imf/imfwpa/ 14-125.html 

Raddatz, C. (2009). The Wrath of God: Macroeconomic Costs of Natural Disasters. The World Bank. Retrieved from https://ideas.repec.org/p/wbk/wbrwps/5039.html 

Connect with the authors

About the BSE Master’s Program in International Trade, Finance, and Development

Criminals or Victims? Evidence on Forced Migration and Crime from the Colombia-Venezuela Border

ITFD master project by Maria Dale, Giacomo Gattorno, Andre Osorio, Rebeca Peers, and Kerenny Torres ’20

Editor’s note: This post is part of a series showcasing Barcelona School of Economics master projects. The project is a required component of all BSE Master’s programs.

Abstract

How does a sudden migrant crisis affect criminal activity, and through which mechanisms does this effect take place? We approach this topic by studying the effect of Venezuelan migration on crime rates in Colombia, in the context of the recent migrant crisis that made more than 1.2 million Venezuelans cross the border. 

Our study focuses on border provinces, where the presence of non-economic migrants is higher and potential assimilation problems could be exacerbated. Building on the fact that Venezuelan migration to Colombia happened due to apparently exogenous reasons and is unrelated to economic outcomes in the latter, we are able to study the causal effect of this large migration wave on crime rates. 

Our results show that Venezuelan forced migration had no significant effect on overall crime, but a positive and significant effect on personal theft in Colombian border provinces. Furthermore, migration had a positive and significant effect on personal theft victimization rates of both Venezuelans and Colombians, while only having significant effects on the criminalization rates of Venezuelans. These results are robust to different specifications and controls, and two placebo tests provide strong evidence in favor of our empirical strategy and results. Finally, we link our findings with the overarching criminal context in Colombian border provinces, and develop relevant policy recommendations based on our findings.

Conclusions

In this paper we analyzed the impact of the Venezuelan migrant crisis, which saw more than 1.2 million Venezuelans cross the border, on crime rates in Colombian border provinces between 2014 and 2018. We focused on the border provinces to study the particular effects of non-economic migration, as we find that migrants in this area did not target areas with specific characteristics but just settled in the closest center to get food, medicine and essential services. This settlement decision strictly based on closeness to border is also illustrated by the figure below: not only is the highest share of foreign-born population in the Colombian regions concentrated in our area of study (the 7 border provinces), but within these border provinces there is also a clear concentration in municipalities on the physical border with Venezuela.

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Figure 1. Venezuelan-born population as % of total population by province and municipality, 2018. Source: Own calculations, based on data from DANE.

The main contribution of our study was presenting compelling and robust evidence on no significant effect of Venezuelan forced migration on overall crime, but a positive and significant effect on personal theft in Colombian border provinces. By also analyzing both the direct and indirect mechanisms through which this migration inflow can have an effect on different crime rates, we’re able to establish a causal effect of migration on both personal theft victimization and criminalization rates of Venezuelans, while only having significant effects on the victimization rates of Colombians.

Besides our key findings, other results hint at a more holistic narrative: migration also had a positive and significant effect on both homicide and personal injury victimization rates of Venezuelans. What could be driving these effects? As seen previously, Venezuelan migrants settled in municipalities right across the border from Venezuela – which, coincidentally, are municipalities where criminal organizations have a large presence: criminal organizations are present in 23 of the 42 municipalities on the border, and in 39 of the 81 municipalities where the change in proportion of Venezuelan migrants between 2014-18 was above the average. 

In these high migration municipalities, as a consequence of criminal activity, homicide rates tended to be much higher at baseline than in other municipalities. Moreover, we see some evidence of discrimination in homicides – after controlling for all relevant socioeconomic covariates, being Venezuelan seems to have a significant and positive effect on being a victim of homicide. 

This additional information could help construct the following holistic narrative and recommendations: 

  • A large wave of migrants arrived in low-income border provinces with little (formal) employment opportunities, and some had to resort to small-scale theft to make a living, which explains the positive effect of migration on Venezuelan personal theft criminalization rates
  • Driven by both opportunity and attractiveness of targets, this caused an increase in personal theft victimization rates for both Colombians and Venezuelans, although it was much higher for the former than for the latter.
  • However, these municipalities were controlled largely by criminal organizations, which started threatening Venezuelans and forcefully recruiting them in large numbers. This could help explain the positive and significant effect of migration on both homicide and personal injury victimization rates of Venezuelans.
  • These findings imply that government policies should focus on reducing the vulnerability of Venezuelans by providing swift access to the formal labor market, either in border provinces or nationwide, so that Venezuelans can avoid resorting to small-scale theft and escape forced recruitment and exploitation from criminal organizations.

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